Politics as Usual: Thoughts on the new government
Benyamin Netanyahu started the coalition negotiations desperate to avoid the mistake he made in 1996. Then, he formed what’s colloquially known as a narrow right-wing coalition with Shas, the National Religious Party, United Torah Judaism, and the now defunct Yisrael BaAliyah and the Third Way. The government barely lasted three years. From the outset, then, Bibi wanted to avoid a repeat of this scenario. With his cards on the table so early, though, did his rivals manage to make the most of the situation? Or has Netanyahu (for it is Netanyahu, now, with all the backbiting within the Likud) emerged triumphant?
At first, Netanyahu tried to form a national unity government with Kadima. Having won more seats in the Knesset, Livni’s party arguably had more legitimacy to form a government than Likud. This meant that Bibi had to at least be seen going through the motions of trying to form a government with her. But I think his attempt was genuine. He reasoned that, whatever ideological differences there may be between the different parties on the future creation of a Palestinian state, there’s near consensus between the major players that to establish one in the next few years would be folly. So why not build a national unity government on the basis of the relative consensus that exists on the more urgent issues of Iran and the economy?
Despite various late-night trysts, the negotiations with Livni failed. By the end, Bibi was wondering aloud what kind of naïve political advice his rival was getting. This is unfair. Livni might have sold out for a more egalitarian rotation-agreement (as opposed to the other variations she was offered, in which Bibi remained the first among equals), but since when was guaranteeing a strong opposition to the public considered politically irresponsible? By drawing a clear dividing line between Kadima and Likud – if only on the issue of Palestinian statehood – Livni has managed to show Netanyahu up for what he seems to be, which is part of the rejectionist camp. The world should take notice.
Meanwhile, Bibi ploughed on with securing the support of his ‘natural partners’ on the right. Avigdor Lieberman’s Yisrael Beytenu gave him his first major coup, but at a predictably steep price. Lieberman will be the new Israeli Foreign Minister, domestically the least significant position of Israel’s holy trinity of cabinet positions, but a cause for deep alarm in the international community, where he will be responsible for making the case for Israel. Given that Bibi is transparently in thrall to American power, and given the recent election of Obama, I’m surprised that Lieberman got the position. I understand the corruption charges against him mean the Treasury would be an irony too far, and that he lacks the military experience to qualify him for the Defence Ministry (although I’m in rare agreement with Moishe Yaalon’s suggestion that the Defence Minister should be lifted from an exclusively civilian background), but was this really the lesser evil? Or was he just hoping to pull the rug out from under Lieberman at the last moment by dramatically bringing in Kadima? Perhaps Lieberman will succumb to the charges being made against him, in which case solving the problem for Netanyahu once and for all.
In the end, though, Netanyahu turned to his old buddy Barak for a modicum of unity. This deal is being dubbed in some quarters as the Israeli equivalent of the Nazi-Soviet pact (despite the precedent of Dayan joining Begin in 1977 and Peres joining Sharon in 2001), so it’s worth being a bit more sober in our analysis. Labour’s dilemma demonstrates the impossibility of the Israeli system. We all know that Barak’s cynicism is barely concealed, that he’s generally interested in maintaining his status at all costs, and that he’ll zig-zag like a zapped Mario Kart buggy if the need arises. But even a broken clock is right two times a day; as a result we should have more sympathy for the choice that was laid before the Labour party.
The coalition agreement between Labour and Likud represents an outstanding piece of political bargaining on Barak’s part, although most of the credit needs to go to Histradut leader Ofer Deini. In returned for an unprecedented failure in the elections, Labour receives five cabinet posts, as well as important (and very un-Bibi like) policy commitments in the socio-economic sphere – NIS100 million for retraining people for new professions, NIS200 million for funding day-care for working women’s children, as well as an increase in pensions and a greater involvement in decision-making for the Histradut. It’s the dying explosions of the power of labour in this country, of course, but that doesn’t alter its significance. Nor does the fact that the treasury is effectively empty – budgetary promises are the name of the game for all the parties, no matter the economic reality. No wonder Lieberman was pissed off.
But should Labour have abandoned the country to the dogs, in the hope that the government would fall quickly, leaving Labour in a position to return strengthened a year or two down the line? Or were they right to join the government in order to protect the interests of millions of people up and down the country? History will tell us; in the meantime it’s important to take note that the Labour party is now little more than Shas for kibbutzniks.
It may still turn good for the Tsar. The presence of Labour in the government gives Lieberman slightly more legitimacy in the eyes of the world, while at the same time his voters are reminded that he was not given his proper place at the table, that they will have to push harder next time. Lieberman is in an envious position; he is both an indispensable part of the government and a potential agitator in the county at large. Sometimes it doesn’t have to be an either/or. Livni is now the strangest of opposition leaders, all alone, in charge of a party that remains dominated by Likudniks in all-but name, left with no other option than to turn left at a time when it’s considered dangerous to do so.
I’ll pass on the predictions regarding how long the government will last; events will no doubt determine the future. Netanyahu has completed his first mission reasonably successfully, and – dare I say it – maturely, at least given the circumstances. Far trickier tasks lie before him, and I’m cynical as to whether he has the ability to see them through. In the meantime, we should reflect on how long Israel can persist with this system in which it takes a month to form an unstable government and in which the interests of the nation (yes, I still believe there to be such a thing) are held hostage to the interests of a few. Politics as usual indeed…
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I didn’t know Yaalon had said that about having a civilan Defense Minister.
When Peretz got the job there were several supportive op-eds countering the more predictable sceptical ones, suggesting that having a civilan DM showed greater political maturity. Unfortunately, Peretz was found seriously wanting during the 2nd Lebanon War and the national sigh of relief that greeted “Israel’s-most-decorated-soldier” Barak’s entry into the Defense Ministry shows that the public feel more secure with a military man at the helm.
On the flip side, Moshe Arens is widely regarded as being one of the more effective DMs in recent times and he had no military background to speak of.
Personally I’d have been interested to see Dan Meridor in the position, a “civilian” but the author of a criminally ignored policy paper on Israel’s long-term defense doctrine.
Useful thoughts…Yaalon says it in his autobiography. Needless to say, it wouldn’t have prevented him from becoming DM if the negotiations with Labour had collapsed…
Do you think the system is to blame? I’m not that sure. Israel is a very fragmented society (with one major conflict it is unable to deal with), and the political reality represents this fact. To put it in other words: do we prefer that some groups wouldn’t be represented, in order to get more stability? Because I believe that’s where most changes will lead us.
I used to think that the system was ok because it reflected the reality of society. I don’t think this works anymore though. If Israel has any future we have to return to the task of nation-building, which might mean that some groups get subsumed into others.
i think that whilst i disagree with lieberman in a sense in some ways i agree with him on certain issues. on the whole secular issue im completely in agreement with him- it’s just a shame there isn’t a party like shinui anymore. I also think lieberman will be much more moderate in what he says as foreign secretary, indeed if the jc’s last week article was anything to go by this was the case. Personally i would have gone for silvan shalom as foreign secretary, someone who was for disengagement and for two state solution-unfortunately petty stupid rivalry between him and bibi stopped this from happening.
as for livni , i have to disagree alex it was stupidly naive by livni – , look netanyahu is much less right wing on the issue of peace then many in likud- he’s already talking about 25 economic peace projects on the west bank and when he was last in power he did sign the wye river accords.
also lieberman has very good relations with russia – russia’s relationship with israel has recently been strained maybe this was in netanyahu’s thoughts?
I just wrote about this on my site, and have the view that Bibi and Barak are mirror images of one another, who came together as a natural alliance of pragmatic megalomaniacs pursuing personal power, wealth and fame over any particular ideology.
Neither are nationalist or religious, but both are willing to use the parties which are to build coalitions while being careful to not commit to any serious policy changes beyond some lip-service speeches and carefully worded, open-ended agreements that mean little or nothing. They are status quo seekers, and will avoid the agendas of both the concessionist left and the expansionist right in order to maintain power and keep order.
Ironically, Kadima has become an ideological party, refusing to compromise on their key principle of making unilateral concessions to the arabs, and completing the bizarre, contradictory legacy of Ariel Sharon from the hardline, “Bulldozer” general who championed Yesha, to the concessionist dove who in his final years was determined to kill the dream of Greater Israel and create the leftwing political party of Kadima in order to advance that mission.
It is my contention that the fallout of this merger of Likud/Labor will result in the solidification of Kadima as the party most representing Israel’s mainstream left, perhaps even expanding further left into some less militant humanist and post-Zionist circles, while Labor transforms into the party of the pragmatic center-left, more reluctantly making concessions than Kadima, but more willingly than Likud.
Labor is dead. Why would anyone vote for them next election? What do they stand for? It’s very disappointing.
“To put it in other words: do we prefer that some groups wouldn’t be represented, in order to get more stability?”
It depends on what doesn’t get represented. When you have as many parties running as Israel does, many of them overlap to massive degrees. In Canada, we have had three major national parties (and one Quebec independence party) for years. The recent addition of the Green Party has already split the votes with a very marginally different platform, so that the government is not representative of the people. Granted, Israel’s politics are more complicated, but there is simply no need for so many parties.
Say you had:
Religious Ashkenazi
Religious Mizrakhi
Right wing secular
Centrist
Centre-left
Far left
Arab party
Maybe I’m missing a part or two, but really, does Israel need 20 parties? The main problem is not even on the edges, but the fact that Yisrael Beiteinu, Likud, Labor, Kadima, and Meretz could easily just be three parties instead of five. I’m not talking about majority governments, but coalitions that could be built with 2 or 3 parties in a number of ways would greatly reduce the ability to blackmail in order to get into cabinet as well as make governments more stable.
“If Israel has any future we have to return to the task of nation-building, which might mean that some groups get subsumed into others.”
Precisely. Some might accuse me of fascism, but at some point, national interest needs to supersede multiculturalism, otherwise societal progress will most likely remain an elusive goal.