False Dichotomies

1. In the more violent corners of the hip-hop community, reality is clear: Don’t walk around like you can’t get touched. Whatever the signals coming from your enemies may be, stay on your guard. I suspect the Hamas leadership doesn’t listen to much hip-hop, but I’m still surprised at how naively they’ve behaved over the past few days. Firstly, their post-ceasefire strategy has been based on the mistaken assumption that Israel wouldn’t react to rocket fire during an election campaign. Secondly, they were deceived by two Israel manoeuvres: the temporary withdrawal of troops from the Gaza envelope, and the decision to send in a relatively large number of trucks with humanitarian aid on Friday. Add to this the mistaken belief that Israel would never attack on Shabbat, and it becomes clear how Hamas were totally flummoxed. New policemen gathered at a Hamas headquarters for their graduation ceremony, while senior figures in the movement sat down together for a meeting. Both were met with the destruction wrought by the Israeli bombing campaign. The message was clear: do not expect to carry on managing your affairs as normal while your co-conspirators continue to attack Israeli with impunity. Whatever the circumstances, you can be touched.

2. The pictures of the deaths at the police graduation ceremony were particularly shocking. But this should not blind ourselves to the fact that they were employees of the Hamas government, participating in a ceremony in a Hamas installation. In an attempt to “civilianise” these casualties, some have pointed out that the policemen came from across the Palestinian political divide, that wearing uniform did not make them culpable for the sins of Hamas. Would the same be said if a uniformed member of the Israeli Home Front were killed in a Hamas attack? Once again, the primary responsibility lies with Hamas, a point understood clearly by the Egyptian Foreign Minister: “We told them to stop firing, but they refused to listen. The responsibility is with them.”

3. Without wishing to fall into the cliche of once again citing the famous midrash about not rejoicing over the death of one’s enemies, I’m disturbed by the fact that only on page 10 (of an old-skool style ‘special edition’, noch) of Yediot Ahranot do we get to the bit about casualties in Gaza. Sure, there are a couple of articles written by Gazans themselves, but this is not enough. Whatever the circumstances, it’s vital to try and get a real sense of the suffering/feelings of the other side.

4. One of the more underreported aspects of Israeli planning towards “Solid Lead” are the considerations vis-a-vis Gilad Shalit. According to assessments, despite threats to the contrary, Hamas won’t harm the captured Israeli soldier. This is based on the conclusion that Shalit is a vital strategic pawn in Hamas’ hands, one that they wouldn’t want to risk losing. An extension of this is that the Israeli government - rightly, I think – views Hamas as a rational actor. The significance of this is that some kind of rapprochement – albeit of the conflict management variety – may eventually be achievable.

5. The best cautionary analyses of the weekend’s events have been written by Bernard Avishai and Yossi Sarid.  It is clear that the operation in Gaza has been carried out far more professionally (both in the political and military echelons) than the opening salvos in the Second Lebanon War. At the same time, it remains unclear what the end-goal is. Teaching Hamas a lesson is one thing, “changing the rules of the game” quite another. Our ambitions should remain modest, and our strategists should remember the limitations of force, that the longer the operation goes on, the greater the likelihood that Israel will be defeated. Anything more than a limited ground invasion, for example, would be a disaster. We can get touched too.