Winter Warz

“The Des’y got a beautiful ring/I can hit any one of y’all, options is a beautiful thing.” Jadakiss (Mighty D-Block, 2 Guns Up)

Last Tuesday evening I was at Shuk HaCarmel, buying some apples. Having selected the least bruised of the bunch, I stepped forward to make the purchase. Around me, all the talk was of the oncoming winter. “I won’t be here tomorrow,” said the stall-owner. “There’ll be a lot of rain; I’m going to take the day off.” I hadn’t kept up to date with the latest weather forecast, and was keen to know more. “Is winter here then?” I asked. “Yep,” he told me, confidently. “Haven’t you heard? They had stopped it at Erez checkpoint, but have decided to let it in tomorrow.” I wandered off with my apples, pondering this dark humour, while the wind began its anticipatory swirl up above.

Talk of stopping the weather at Erez may have been figurative, but it’s clear that metereological assessments have played a major role in the events of the last few days. Over the course of the week, it became apparent that – despite the election campaign – the Israeli government wanted to launch an attack, limited in scope, against Hamas infrastructure in the Gaza Strip. Analysts suggested the attack would come early next week, and then the skies cleared. Most Arab-Israeli violence takes place in the summer, for obvious reasons. Now, though, Saturday’s relatively mild conditions meant that the IAF could go into action, that a sneak attack could be launched.

At the time of writing, estimates suggest that ongoing Israeli attacks on Gaza have killed around 150 Palestinians, with one Israeli killed by Palestinian rocket fire. Following the brinkmanship of recent weeks, the pieces have finally started crumbling. The two parties have been drawn into the opening storms of a potential escalation which common sense has told us that neither of them wanted. The Israeli/Egyptian blockade of Gaza continues, the prisoner exchange negotiations seem to have led nowhere, and Hamas intransigence over recognising Israeli remains unaltered. The future looks bleak.

It is a mistake to believe there are easy solutions to this problem. The idea that ending the blockade will end the rockets seems fanciful. Rockets were fired before the blockade was in place, with the Hamas leadership preferring to use Gaza as an extra staging-ground for attacks on Israel, rather than a place in which to try and make something – despite the difficult circumstances – of the first significant piece of territory the Palestinians had managed to liberate from Israeli occupation. Those who claim to be friends of the Palestinians do themselves no favours by ignoring this elementary fact.

The blockade, however, has been a disaster. Counterinsurgency 101 warns against pissing off the civilian population; a lesson Israel has still not internalised, over 40 years since the seventh day of the Six Day War. It is one thing to stand firm in the face of the Hamas refusal to recognise Israel, quite another to allow a territory populated by 1.5 million human beings to teeter on the brink of anarchy. You don’t have to be a peacenik to get this: with the underground economy flourishing, the blockade gives Hamas yet another method to maintain its control on the Strip. A wiser policy would be the opposite of a blockade, flooding the market with Israeli goods in order to weaken Hamas’ control.

What about the military dimension? No sovereign state should have to tolerate a situation in which its citizens live under the threat of rocket attack from a hostile territory ruled by an organisation committed to its destruction. The problem is, short of an all-out war with Gaza or a negotiated agreement between two sides, all the IDF can do is stem the flow. I don’t need to spell out the problems with an all-out war. As for a negotiated agreement, this also seems unlikely, although violent skirmishes between the two sides are often followed by unexpected agreements.

Perhaps the only answer is to manage the situation, for the two sides to vent off some steam and then get back to the ceasefire, until the next round. But what if the point of no return has already been passed? On the Palestinian side, the Second Intifada built up steam on the mistaken assumption that the West Bank could be the set for the sequel to Israel’s 2000 withdrawal from South Lebanon. In Gaza, Hamas – fuelled by ideological intransigence and religious pathos – seem convinced that they can do a Hezbollah. Again, a catastrophic mistake, at least if you are actually concerned about the value of human life.

In short, options are a beautiful thing indeed, but only when used in combination with one another. For too long, Israel has relied on its military power, neglecting the importance of diplomacy, among other tools in its armoury. If we again rely on force alone, we will become a part of Groundhog Day, repeating our mistakes without securing any victories. With Hamas increasing the range of its rockets, this cannot be allowed to happen. It is time that we started thinking a little more.